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Purposeful tool use in early lithic
technologies
Chris Baber1 and Klint Janulis2
Abstract
Tool use can be considered in terms of purposeful behaviour. This emphasis on ‘purpose’ hides a host of assumptions
about the nature of cognition and its relationship with physical activity. In particular, a notion of ‘purpose’ might assume
that this is teleological which, in turn, requires a model of a desired end state of an action that can be projected onto
the environment. Such a model is fundamental to traditional descriptions of cognition and a version of this can be found
in the ‘template’ theory of stone-tool production (i.e. where the maker of the tool has a model in mind and attempts to
reproduce this model in stone). Against this cognitive perspective, a number of approaches have been proposed that
share their roots in the work of Gibson (i.e. ecological psychology) or Bernstein (i.e. dynamic systems). From these per-
spectives, ‘purpose’ is not a matter of a projection but opportunity; put simply, an action is performed until it need not
be performed further. Trivial though this might sound, it has implications for how we define purpose and how this might
apply to our understanding of tool use. We argue from a dynamic systems perspective and demonstrate the use of tools
to crack bones for marrow extraction.
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Organista et al. (2019) report a survey of the Bell’s
Korongo 3b site at Olduvai Gorge (dating from 1.35
Ma). They found evidence of cut marks on 29% of
bone samples suggesting butchery and stripping of car-
casses. The properties of tools for butchery can be con-
sidered in terms of their morphology, size, sharpness
(Key & Lycett, 2019), the anatomy and strength of the
tool user (Marzke & Shackley, 1986), the type of grip
that the user can apply to the tool (Silva-Gago et al.,
2019) and the posture that is adopted when using the
tool (McGorry et al., 2004) . In other words, ‘... it is
now well established that both the form of a stone tool
and the biometric traits of the individual using it can
influence its functional performance’ (Key & Lycett,
2019, p. 540). One would also add that the properties
of the material to be cut, for example, hide, flesh and
sinew, would have a bearing on the performance of
these activities. These factors (the tool, the user, the
materials on which the tool were used) can be consid-
ered a ‘tool-using system’ which can support and con-
strain activity (Baber, 2003, 2006). In this article, we
will argue that the organisation of such a system
constitutes a form of cognition in which purposeful
action emerges from the inter-relationships within this
system.
Organista et al. (2019) also found evidence of bone
breakage on 533 bones, with some 193 long bones
showing green breakage and others showing dry breaks
‘... which suggests a biotic agent of bone-breaking’ (p.
125). There is evidence, from archaeological and model-
ling studies, of stone tools being used on the bones of
large fauna (Binford, 1981, 1983; Blumenschine, 1988,
1995; Capaldo & Blumenschine, 1994; Mora & de la
Torre, 2005; Pante, 2013). In another recent analysis,
‘The overall incidence of percussion marking at HWK
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WW suggests hominins were breaking the majority of
limb bones for marrow extraction ...’ (Pante et al.,
2018, p. 231). Interestingly, Arroyo and de la Torre
(2018) have suggested that ‘percussive objects’ recov-
ered from Olduvai Gorge indicate differences in pur-
pose: with stones from EF-HR (1.6–1.5 Ma) more
likely to be associated with stone-tool production and
stones from WHK EE (1.7 Ma) more likely to be used
for bone breaking or bipolar knapping. However, while
much of the experimental archaeology research has
focused on the use of sharp flakes and handaxes for
butchery (Toth & Schick, 2018), less work has consid-
ered percussive actions relating to bone breaking. There
might, perhaps, be an assumption that such activity
need not require well-formed stone tools or to represent
particularly ‘skilled’ activity.
In her consideration of ‘non-knapped stones’ in the
archaeological record, de Beaune (2000) notes that
‘Certains objets ont souvent été négligés par les préhis-
toriens, qui les jugeaient trop humbles’ (p. 98) and such
‘trop humbles’ objects could be used for activity such
as ‘du concassage des os en vue de l’extraction de la
moelle ...’ (p. 98). Hammering to open a bone for the
extraction of marrow could be similar to hammering to
open a nut (Toth & Schick, 2009). However, as we will
suggest later in this article, the superficial similarities of
these percussive tasks hide particular differences that
have implications for the choice of tool to use and how
it is used (and for the notion of cognition that we are
posing). Accessing bone marrow is a distinctly different
task than slicing through hide, butchering an animal or
scavenging of meat from a carcass. Consequently, one
might expect the hammerstone, handaxe or cleaver that
is used for bone cracking to differ from tools used for
these other forms of butchery.
To appreciate whether a particular stone could be
appropriately utilised, there needs to be an appreciation
of purpose. The term ‘purpose’ suggests an organisation
of movement that is directed towards a goal (and goal-
directed behaviour is a well-recognised and popular def-
inition of ‘cognition’). The use of the word ‘organisa-
tion’ here is important because, to successfully perform
a percussive task, there are several choices which need
to be made. These choices imply some mechanism that
organises the movement and anticipates the conse-
quences of movement on a goal.
For bone cracking, the goal is to access the marrow
inside the bone (presumably while also minimising the
risk of bone fragments contaminating the marrow). In
the study of human motor control, a common approach
to questions of goal and organisation of movement
assumes a centralised, brain-based ‘action generator’
that defines and manages movement. Such a control
mechanism is assumed to provide the requisite organi-
sation, in terms of action selection, sequencing, timing
and so on. These ideas have a well-established history
across movement science (Keele, 1968; Schmidt, 1975)
and are predicated on fundamental assumptions of
internal (mental) models. In robotics, this approach is
often defined in terms of ‘sense-model-plan-act’
(Brooks, 1991). Such models propose that data are
extracted from the environment through our senses,
these data are then used to reconstruct an internal
model of the environment, and this model is used to
plan actions and project consequences of these actions.
In this article, we term such approaches ‘cognitivism’.
An alternative approach assumes that ‘... Control
lies in the animal-environment system ...; behavior is
regular without being regulated’ (J. J. Gibson, 1979, p.
225). Such a ‘system’ is, therefore, defined by ‘con-
straints’ (Newell, 1986) which arise from the animal,
the environment and the task, and which help the sys-
tem to self-organise to maintain stability (or homeosta-
sis). Self-organisation requires feedback loops between
animal and environment, such that the state of the
environment provides opportunities for the animal to
act, and the animal’s actions change the state of the
environment. From this perspective, an acceptable out-
come is one that satisfies these constraints as far as pos-
sible. Broadly speaking, one can assume that, given the
constraints imposed by its own ability, the animal per-
forms activity that is most appropriate to the task con-
straints within a given environment. The focus of such
an approach should be less on the ‘tool-as-object’ than
on the appreciation of how tools can be used by the
animal to operate within these constraints. It is the
manner of operating within these constraints that we
consider to be a defining aspect of ‘purpose’.
The most common way of considering the impact of
these constraints on performance is to apply Dynamic
Systems methods that draw on control-theoretic models
of activity (see Haken et al., 1985; Kelso et al., 1986;
Kugler & Turvey, 1987). These approaches stem from
the work of Bernstein and his definition of the Degrees
of Freedom problem in human movement (Bernstein,
1967). That is, any movement, say of the hand, arm and
tool, involves joints which can be rotated in different
directions (or ‘degrees of freedom’ in their movement)
and controlled action requires these degrees of freedom
to be minimised (while also allowing sufficient variabil-
ity to cope with changes in the situation). For Bernstein
(1967), solving the degrees of problem most likely
involved a hierarchy of control actions, moderated by
feedback to allow adaptation. More recent variations
of this, for example, ‘synergetics’ (Fuller, 1975; Haken,
1977) describe self-assembly of systems, through the
alignment of elements to create behaviour that cannot
be predicted solely through consideration of individual
elements. In the study of human movement, this has
inspired research into coordinated, rhythmical move-
ment, from finger-tapping (Haken et al., 1985) to saw-
ing (Starke & Baber, 2017). In this approach, an Order
parameter defines the system (i.e. states in which the
system is stable, or ordered), Control parameters
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manage Order within the system (i.e. actions which can
be performed) and the relationship between Order and
Control parameters can be captured mathematically.
From this perspective, the ‘purpose’ of the system is to
manage and maintain Order. In a similar manner, the
well-known work of Bril and her colleagues defines
activity in terms of the functional parameters of a given
task (Biryukova & Bril, 2008; Bril et al., 2000, 2005,
2009, 2010, 2012; Parry et al., 2014; Rein et al., 2013;
Roux et al., 1995). In this work, the human seeks to
manage the functional parameter which defines and
constrains the outcome of the task, for example, the
most appropriate level of kinetic energy to apply when
knapping flint. These ideas fundamentally challenge the
‘cognitivist’ approach through their emphasis on ‘rea-
soning’ as the dynamic engagement of the animal in dis-
covering and responding to task constraints (rather
than the creation of a ‘model-in-the-mind’ that fully
specifies the route to a goal that cognitivism assumes).
Rather than assume that all of this information is
encapsulated in the mental model and motor pro-
gramme of the actor (as cognitivism might assume), a
Dynamic Systems approach focuses on the performa-
tive aspects of the activity and the ‘coordinative struc-
ture’ (Bernstein, 1967) which the actor applies to the
task. Repeated performance of a task, such as hammer-
ing with a stone, results in a combination of joint and
muscle activations which occur in synergy. Think, for
instance, of what it feels like to play a shot in golf or
tennis where you ‘know’ that this is ‘good’ (or ‘bad’)
because the activation of joints and muscles ‘feel’ right
and the movement has a kinetic melody (Luria, 1973)
arising from the familiar feeling of the action.
Percussive actions, such as hammering, pounding or
cracking open a bone, might appear to involve less
‘cognition’ than either cutting and scraping or flint-
knapping, but such actions still require knowledge of
the purpose to which the tool is being put. Dexterity in
tasks such as flint-knapping improves with practice
(Geribàs et al., 2010; Hovers, 2009; Nonaka et al.,
2010) and requires an appreciation the ways in which
impact of hammerstone is controlled. This is not simply
a matter of the actions involved in knapping but char-
acteristic of other percussive actions (Bril et al., 2012).
For example, a study of modern hunter-gatherers, the
!Kung people, Bock (2015) noted a marked effect of
age of ability to crack nuts using stones (with perfor-
mance peaking in the mid 30s). That this ability can
improve with time suggests that there is more to ham-
mering than meets the eye. This suggests that learning
to perform an activity is a matter of configuring the
system; that is, selecting an appropriate tool, selecting
an appropriate posture and grip, performing an appro-
priate movement, anticipating the outcome (to modify
these parameters) and judging the outcome.
In observations of monkeys, Mangalam et al. (2016)
found that ‘wild bearded capuchins modulated kinematic
parameters ... according to type and condition of nut’
(p. 34). Interestingly, they observed that the monkeys
applied negative effort when using heavy stones, presum-
ably to control point of impact and velocity, maintain
stability or reduce injury. In her account of capuchins’
pounding and digging activity, Mosley (this issue) notes
how these can be considered in terms of their broader
patterns of destructive foraging. As such, the tool-using
activity is not simply about the ‘tool’ per se, but about
the relationship between capuchin and environment such
... digging tools may act to re-inforce the affordance rele-
vance, confirming the presence of food resource even when
the capuchin cannot see it ..., as if tool use by revealing the
nature of the foraging problem, were also drawing forth
the intent to solve it. (p. 6)
The ‘technical reasoning’ (Osiurak, 2020) or
‘mechanical reasoning’ (Overmann & Wynn, 2019)
involved in tool use is guided by perception-action cou-
pling (J. J. Gibson, 1979). That is, the animal’s percep-
tion is tuned to features of the environment upon
which it can act. As a simple example, the visual per-
ception of a bee means that it cannot see the colour red
but can see in the ultraviolet spectrum which (as well as
sensing differences in electrical charge) allows it to
detect pollen in flowers. This illustrates that the rela-
tionship (between animal and environment) is as much
a matter of the capabilities of the animal as it is of the
state of the environment, such that, the ‘affordances’ of
the task (J. J. Gibson, 1977, 1979; Wynn, this issue).
For this article, we assume that ‘affordances’ emerge
from the animal–environment system as the product of
the features of the environment salient to the animal’s
intent, the capabilities of the animal to perceive these
features, and the desire and capability of the animal to
respond to these features.
Taken together, these principles from Dynamic
Systems and the concept of affordance form the basis
of Radical Embodied Cognitive Science (Chemero,
2013). This suggests that organisation of behaviour is
not caused by a central controller but emerges as a con-
sequence of interactivity within the animal–
environment system. This means that, rather than seek-
ing to describe a motor programme which causes move-
ment, it would be more beneficial to describe the
context in which movement occurs. While this might
feel as if it reasonably describes action, it leaves open
the question of how a purpose might be defined. In
‘cognitivist’ accounts, a purpose is similar to a goal and
is determined prior to movement to define the quality
of the outcome of this movement. In this, the purpose
could be considered in terms of a ‘mental model’ of the
future state of the world to which the action is directed.
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For dynamic systems accounts, the state of animal, for
example, hunger, provides initial impetus for action,
and the state of the environment, for example, prey,
provides opportunity for action in terms of the capabil-
ity of the animal, for example, whether it can run fast
enough to catch the prey, which leads to an outcome,
for example, prey being caught and eaten. Rather than
cognitivism’s prospective argument (that purpose pro-
duces an outcome), a dynamic systems approach
favours a retrospective argument (that the outcome can
be described by a purpose). A consequence of this dis-
tinction is that actions (for the dynamic systems
approach) are more likely to be opportunistic, more
likely to rely heavily on situational factors, more likely
to vary with the capabilities of the actor, and more
likely to be justified after the event (rather than neces-
sarily assuming that one must have a goal to act).
Furthermore, given the focus on the human–tool–envi-
ronment system, one can appreciate that changing any
of these elements could have a bearing on the outcome.
1. Cognitive archaeology and
‘Cognitivism’
From his discussion of the role cognitive science in
lithic analysis, Mahaney (2014) concludes that,
‘Evolutionary cognitive archaeology is in need of a gen-
eral theoretical framework with which to approach
lithic technology’ (p. 184). Having said this, the concept
of ‘cognition’ used in ‘cognitive archaeology’ differs
considerably (Ambrose, 2001; Coolidge & Wynn, 2009;
Davidson, 2010, 2016; de Beaune et al., 2009; K. R.
Gibson & Ingold, 1993; Isaac, 1986; Wynn, 1991,
2002).
We do not intend to unravel the threads of these var-
ious positions in this article (some of which are closer
than others to the line that we are taking). However, we
agree with Malafouris (2013) in his argument that there
are three ‘commitments’ on the way that tool use is
commonly discussed in the archaeological literature
and which suggest a commitment to cognitivism:
‘[O]ntological’ commitment ... Intentionality is a necessary
condition of artifactuality ... ‘[A]gentive’ commitment ...
The human agent (i.e., the knapper) ‘imposes’ the intended
‘form’ on the object ... ‘[T]emporal’ commitment ... The
form of the object exists before its objectification in stone.
(Malafouris, 2013, p. 163)
Taken together these ‘commitments’ emphasise the tool
user having a goal in mind and seeking to use or make
a tool to produce an outcome that matches this goal,
that is, a commitment to cognitivism Malafouris rejects
and that we question in this article. Indeed, if one
accepts Malafouris’ proposals, then stone tools can be
thought of as ‘... genuine cognitive extensions or pros-
theses ... [and] ... the standard interpretation of
material culture as mere leftovers of our cognitive pro-
cesses ... can be questioned’ (Chakrabarty, 2019, p.
259). Given advances in the taphonomic analysis of
bones and micro-analysis of bones and stone tools
(Arroyo & de la Torre, 2018; Organista et al., 2019), it
is possible to build detailed notions of the outcomes of
tool use from the marks left on bones and stone tools
(e.g. in terms of bone cracking, scraping and flesh cut-
ting) and this continues to raise the question of what
‘cognition’ was necessary and sufficient to enable such
activity?
In his discussion of ‘handaxe enigmas’, Wynn (1995)
asked whether (given their symmetry) early stone han-
daxes could have been produced without a ‘concept’ of
a handaxe? However, arguing from a worked tool to
cognition involves what Davidson (2002) calls the ‘fin-
ished artefact fallacy’; he points out that one cannot
treat a stone tool as a record of the maker’s intentions.
Davidson (2002) suggests that the similarity of forms
across different stone tool assemblages could reflect the
ways in which stone as a material responds to particu-
lar processes of flake removal (as opposed to the tool
makers imposing a form on the stones).
In recent work, Moore and Perston (2016) demon-
strate that Oldowan and Acheulean tools could be pro-
duced from more or less randomised flaking. That is,
handaxe forms, particularly the more basic ones, have
symmetry because of the production technique rather
than from specific plan or application of ‘mental tem-
plate’ (Noble & Davidson, 1996). From this, one might
assume that learning to perform these basic actions in
an appropriate sequence could be sufficient to produce
a recognisable handaxe. Indeed, one of the authors of
this article (K.J.) notes that teaching people to produce
Oldowan tools is relatively straightforward and requires
only a small number of actions, together with an appre-
ciation of how impact forces remove flakes. In an
extreme example of this position, Moore (2011) pro-
poses that knapping is ‘cellular’, that is, each cell com-
prises a set of basic movements, such as rotating,
placing, tilting and striking. Combining these basic
movements need not require ‘cognitive control’ so
much as the mapping of stimulus to response in some
simple learned response. However, reducing knapping
solely to the sequence of physical actions fails to reflect
the ways in which expert knappers perform differently
to novices (Biryukova & Bril, 2008; Bril et al., 2000,
2005, 2009, 2010, 2012; Nonaka et al., 2010; Rein et al.,
2013; Roux et al., 1995).
Gowlett (2006) provides a valuable analysis of the
form of stone tools. As an aside, Gowlett has often
(oddly and wrongly) been blamed (or, at least, cited)
for the idea of a ‘mental template’. From the archaeolo-
gical record, Gowlett (2006) identified several ‘impera-
tives’ of stone tools. These imperatives relate to the
form of the stone, for example, glob-butt, forward-
extension (relating to centre of gravity and distribution
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of mass), support for working edge, lateral extension
(around the major plane), thickness adjustment and
skewness. This set of imperatives is expanded upon by
Wynn (this issue) to relate their form to generic func-
tions to which they can be applied. Gowlett argues that,
‘... biface manufacture cannot be governed by a simple
fixed ‘‘mental template,’’ since this would yield neither
the fields of variation within a dataset, nor the local
variations observed from site to site and even within
sites’ (Gowlett, 2006, p. 4, our emphasis).
Gowlett’s (2006) imperatives address the geometries
(and symmetries) that are possible given the material
and the tasks of knapping. Each of these imperatives is
directly tied to the tools’ functionality, mechanics,
kinetics, ergonomics and ease of manufacture. Within
this model, Gowlett (2006) includes assessment criteria
such as the amount of lateral extension made possible
by the tool, the nature of the end opposite the tip, that
is, held in the hand (‘Glob Butt’), and the amount of
support for the working edge provided by each tool.
We suggest that producing a tool to meet these criteria
requires an appreciation not only of how particular
material responds to knapping activities but also to the
purpose to which the resulting tool will be put. In short,
The production of stone tools reflects levels of cognitive
engagement that are not seen in animals. Cognition is not
so much pre-planned and schema-driven as opportunistic,
allowing for a flexible response to changes in the properties
of the objects being worked. Furthermore, the overall goal
is not the immediate consequence of using the tool, so much
as the production of a tool that can be used for future activ-
ities, and that can be reused. (Baber, 2003, p. 50)
2. On tool use
The distinguishing feature of tool use behaviours is the
manner in which the tool is incorporated into an actor–
environment system. One purpose of using a tool is to
extend one’s ability (i.e. within organism’s constraints)
to effect appropriate changes upon the environment.
Another is to redefine the goal (i.e. within environmen-
tal constraints) and how this can be achieved (i.e.
within task constraints). In broad terms, tool use
embraces (1) appreciation of the relationship between
material and activity in the manipulation of objects as
tool; (2) selection of material to use as objects for tools
and as objects to work; (3) motor-control abilities to
support dexterity in the manipulation of objects as
tools; and (4) biomechanical and anthropometric fac-
tors that support the grasp and manipulation of objects
as tools. Each dimension plays a key role in the ability
to engage in purposeful behaviour, those dimensions
being mutually dependent. For example, manipulation
would be influenced by (and influence) choice of grasp
which might relate to choice of posture and to possible
movements to perform using the tool.
To pre-empt the discussion of our study reported
below, consider using a stone as a hammer on bone: sit-
ting or kneeling and holding the stone in one or two
hands necessarily has impact on the biomechanics of
the movements that are possible; in a similar manner
that the ways in which posture affects forces in modern
butchery (McGorry et al., 2004). We propose that,
additionally, changes in posture or grasp of the tool
affect the dynamics of the system and hence the defini-
tion of purpose that would be most appropriate to this
activity. In this case, the ‘tool’ is not merely an object
associated with movement sequences. Rather, the tool
mediates the interactivity between tool user and envi-
ronment, both in terms of movement and in terms of
perception (the tool directs the user’s attention to that
specific region of the environment that is being worked
on as much as the user directs the movement of the
tools to that region). As the tool changes the state of
the environment, so this (through sensory feedback
loops) changes the perception of the tool user, and the
movements that need to be performed. As Samuel
Butler (1912) puts it, ‘Strictly speaking, nothing is a
tool except during use’.
3. A purposeful use of stone tools:
cracking bones
The stone tool typological systems currently used
within archaeology tend to focus primarily on the man-
ufacturing process, or describe generalised shapes, but
do not often offer much in the way of interpretive value
for telling us about their purpose. For this article, we
note that, by addressing the problem of bone cracking,
we can explore how the ergonomics of tool use (tool
geometry and mechanics) allow comparative assessment
of the activities of meat ‘cutting’ versus bone ‘splitting’.
Our goal was to consider a distinct ‘problem’ to be
solved that has not been addressed in the literature to a
great degree, the task of accessing bone marrow.
Prior experimental archaeology work has shown that
flakes can be remarkably effective for butchery (Schick
& Toth, 1993). Instead of cutting or sawing actions,
bone marrow acquisition requires a tool that can cleave,
chop or wedge into a hard material. From this, one can
assume that the technical problem to be solved involves
specifying an appropriate degree of impact force, suffi-
ciently localised on the bone, to break into the bone
and expose the marrow. This begs the question of what
type of ‘tool’ would be appropriate for this activity? By
analogy with nut-cracking, one might anticipate that a
hammerstone of sufficient mass would be appropriate.
As such, a pebble core might be more suitable than a
crafted stone tool.
We conducted a laboratory study in which several
stone-tool forms were used to crack large bones from
cattle. Full details of these studies and the analysis of
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data will be reported in a separate paper. One author
(K.J.) manufactured a variety of stone tools common
to the Lower Palaeolithic with the goal of extracting
bone marrow from large bones such as those of mega-
fauna carcasses that might have been found in a Lower
Palaeolithic context (in this study we used bones from
the legs of cows, see Figure 1). In this activity, bovid
leg bones were laid in a flat surface (the Kistler force
plate on the floor). We note that there is evidence that
bones might have been hammered on anvils (Mora &
de la Torre, 2005), and this could be a focus for future
study.
3.1. Using a pebble core
If cracking bone was solely a matter of exerting maxi-
mal impact force, then a round pebble might be the
most appropriate object to use. Figure 2 shows a peb-
ble of dense, igneous rock with low silica content. The
pebble had been worked using short angular percussion
for broad flake removal around the perimeter of the
stone. There was no attempt to bifacially thin the tool.
Production time was less than 5 min and required little
skill (although one would need some awareness of the
effects of using a hard hammerstone to fracture this
material).
The edges of this stone were not sharp enough to cut
meat effectively. This, together with the mass of the
stone, suggests that it would have been wielded as a
cleaver. The size and shape of the stone made two-
handed grip somewhat difficult (although not impossi-
ble) and a one-handed grip was preferred – not only for
comfort but also for perceived accuracy of impact. On
average, the kinetic energy calculated when using this
tool was 11.8 N, which was sufficient to result in break-
age and shallow fracture of the bone after two or three
blows.
3.2. Using a well-knapped handaxe
Figure 3 shows an example of a well-formed, bifacial
stone tool. This took the knapper (K.J.) approximately
30 min to produce, with an emphasis on symmetry and
bilateral working. This was made from an elongated
oblong of Anglian flint, with high silica content.
The edges of this tool were sufficiently sharp to eas-
ily slice meat, sinew and tendon. This is the type of tool
and the type of butchery activity that is mentioned
quite often in the literature. However, this tool was
completely ineffective for bone cracking. The tool was
used in either one- or two-handed grip but calculated
kinetic energy averaged 4.9 N (i.e. around half that of
the pebble). The pointed tip of the tool encouraged
‘aiming’ of this point to the impact location on the
bone (meaning that the stone was raised less high than
the pebble, which reduced impact force). More signifi-
cantly, perhaps, the impact was painful, partly because
the narrow edges on the tool’s glob-butt and partly
because the thinness of the tool channelled the impact
force to the hands and fingers with little absorption of
the shock (even when the tool had a piece of leather
held over the glob-butt). We tested tools of similar
form, either one-handed or two-handed, and produced
similar results. This tool is particularly noteworthy in
that it broke on impact (see Figures 3 and 4). A similar
tool broke in identical fashion during testing and we
note, in passing, that the fracture that this activity pro-
duced has been observed in the archaeological record.
3.3. Using a crudely fashioned handaxe
There is, perhaps, a feeling within the archaeological
community that a less well-formed tool is not only
inferior (in appearance) but might also be less useful.
Given that so much of the archaeological record com-
prises less well-formed tools, one might either assume
that these are ‘apprentice pieces’ that are discarded
because knappers are working towards superior, well-
formed pieces, or that these pieces are just the ‘cores’
Figure 1. Photograph of experimental task. A stone tool is
held in the right hand and brought into contact with a beef leg
bone (the blow is aimed at the knuckle between upper and
lower leg). Retroreflective markers are attached to the
headband, the arm, waist and chest, for Motion Capture;
wireless electromyography sensors are placed just above the
elbow joint; the bone is placed on a hard, flat surface (a Kistler
Force Plate covered in cloth to make cleaning easier); high-
speed video cameras (positioned around the laboratory) are
used to record the activity. Joint angles for biomechanical
modelling are superimposed on the image.
We recognise that the use of data from a single participant is not
common practice in biomechanics but emphasise that our focus in this
study was on the differences between tools rather than on the nature of
the skill being performed. We assume that smashing a bone with a stone
would most likely involve similar actions whoever performed it. This is
because we do not anticipate that the impact needs to be targeted and
so could be performed with minimal control, providing sufficient force is
generated. In this article, we consider three of the stone tools that were
used in the study.
6 Adaptive Behavior
from which to take flakes. Figure 4 shows a crudely
fashioned handaxe made from silica and fossil-rich
limestone slab. Production of this tool took as little
time as the pebble, that is, around 5 min. Such tools
are commonly found in the archaeological record and
might correspond to the ‘non-knapped’ tools of which
de Beaune (2000) speaks (albeit that this, like the peb-
ble, has minimal modification rather being an
unworked stone). Indeed, in their analysis, Arroyo and
de la Torre (2018) note that the ‘subspheroid’ stones
they examined bore ‘battering marks’ which suggested
that ‘flaking took place before the tools used in percus-
sive activities’ (p. 405).
The edge of the handaxe shown in Figure 5 was
almost ineffective at butchering. However, this tool was
very effective as a hammer, with an average kinetic
energy of 35.3 N. The kinetic energy was, obviously, a
function of the larger mass of this stone, but was also







Figure 3. (Left) Handaxe modelled after ‘late Acheulean’ (long axis length 140 mm; maximum thickness 33 mm; maximum width 80
mm; mass 0.279 kg); (right) handaxe broken after second hit.
Figure 2. (Left) Pebble Core (long axis length 120 mm; maximum thickness 37 mm; maximum width 90 mm; mass 0.526 kg); (right)
Pebble Core impacting knuckle bone.
Figure 4. Fracture of ‘late Acheulean’ handaxe, showing how
the tip is broken off.
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raised higher, than the well-knapped handaxe, prior to
impact). Notice also that, in comparison with Figure 3,
the ‘tip’ of this tool is much less well defined; the flat-
ness of this ‘tip’ was ideal for channelling impact force
and, in a sense, ‘corrected’ for any imprecision in ‘aim-
ing’. The large, worked aspects of the glob-butt of the
tool allowed for a solid grip (one or two handed) and
even distribution of force while swinging downwards.
The shape of the tool also distributed the impact on the
hands over a broad, uniform area, reducing the pain
from impact. The tool’s broad ‘shoulders’ (the widening
below the glob-butt) meant that it was easier to control
the point of impact while using two hands to deliver a
blow. The tool’s shape and the grip this allowed meant
that it was possible to manipulate the tool in a way that
resulted in the hands having a 45 inward grip, effec-
tively channelling the muscular force of hands and fore-
arms inward and down to control the centripetal force
of the swing. Thus, this tool felt precise and had the
least amount of negative vibratory feedback on the
hands. It was also the most successful of the three in
quickly penetrating the bone, typically with a single
blow.
3.4. Conclusion
This initial account of our experiments lead us to con-
clude that many of the stone tools of the Lower
Palaeolithic make more sense when applied to wedging
and splitting of bone as opposed to butchering of flesh.
This has significant implications for the interpretations
of the manufacture, curation and use of these tools.
Understanding the functionality of tools, in terms of
their purpose and the likely ergonomics of their use,
also helps explain their form (de Beaune, 2000). We
note that the more aesthetically pleasing ‘well-knapped’
tool was ideal for butchery but useless for marrow
extraction.
At its most basic, this task of bone cracking for mar-
row extraction involves delivering force with sufficient
kinetic energy to split the bone. The tool user needs to
reason about several aspects of the task, such as the
selection of the tool, the choice of grip and posture, how
high to raise the stone, and the velocity with which to
deliver the blow. After experimenting with squatting, the
preferred posture for this study was kneeling. We note
that squatting might be preferred in other cultures, but it
felt unbalanced, particularly at the point of impact when
the body was being thrown forward. Using two hands
creates an isosceles triangle of the arms, reducing the
degree of freedom for movement, creating a kinematic
chain of Revolute Joints of the shoulder, wrists and fin-
gers. The shoulders are locked together in the movement
downwards by the hands that are pulling inward at the
same angle towards the target. This inward pressure cre-
ates a more uniform centripetal force.
More significantly, there is no need to invoke a spe-
cific mental template to achieving the specific shape of
the tools we present here. Rather, what is required is
sufficient experience of the purpose to which the tool
will be put. This means that a tool will be created with
the attributes for a specific purpose, that is, to satisfy a
particular functional constraint (Bril et al., 2000). From
experience in practising this task (i.e. bone cracking),
the tool user has a coordinative structure (in terms of
posture, grip, biomechanics) that can be applied to the
environment. This need not be a ‘mental template’
(stored in the brain) but could simply be the ‘normal’
(i.e. familiar and accepted) way in which the action is
performed with a tool for a specific purpose within a
particular group. Hefting a stone on the basis of this
experience and the purpose of this task could be suffi-
cient to determine whether the stone is appropriate in
its original state, or whether it needs modification.
There is a further implication in the reframing of
human behavioural and subsistence adaptations that
Figure 5. (Left) Handaxe modelled after ‘Early Acheulean’ (long axis length 220 mm; maximum thickness 50 mm; maximum width
150 mm; mass 1.51 kg); (right) bone cracking using this handaxe.
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arise from accessing bone marrow that can be inferred
from the stone tool record of the Lower Palaeolithic.
These implications are made more pronounced when
considering the adaptive advantages implied by the
ability to regularly exploit bone marrow as a food
source. Marrow has about four times the caloric den-
sity of skeletal muscle tissue, and marrow may persist
in an edible state in a bone long after the ‘meat’ has
been stripped. This could be a further explanation for
the green fractures of bones observed by Organista et
al. (2019). Bone marrow also has a much lower meta-
bolic cost associated with its digestion than meat or
vegetable material, essentially being what might be
viewed as a partially pre-digested food, creating even
greater adaptive pressure to access marrow.
4. Discussion
There are synergies between a dynamic systems
approach outlined in this article and Material
Engagement Theory (MET) beyond differences in meth-
odology. Here, we consider three of the defining ele-
ments of MET: materiality, intentionality and
embodiment. For MET, the nature of the material and
the way that it responds to being worked is crucial to an
understanding of material culture. These define the
choice of material to use as a tool (and the nature of the
material to be worked), for example, in terms of the
mass of a hammerstone for knapping. This is partly a
matter of appreciating the affordances of specific materi-
als and objects and partly a matter of understanding the
role of the material in defining the functional constraints
of the task. That is, in bone cracking, the use of a stone
of lower mass could result in damage to the stone, lim-
ited breaking of the bone or discomfort to the hand.
The material used will be one of the factors that influ-
ence technique (e.g. one- or two-handed grip, kneeling
or squatting, degree of precision of the impact).
Malafouris (2013) argues that Wynn’s (1995) ‘han-
daxe enigmas’ point to a fundamental question about
intentionality. For Malafouris (2013),
... the stone held in the knapper’s hand did much more
than simply and passively offer the necessary ‘conditions
of satisfaction’ to the knapper’s intention ... I believe that
the directed action of stone knapping does not simply exe-
cute but brings forth the knapper’s intention. The deci-
sions about where to place the next blow and how much
force to use are not taken by the knapper in isolation; they
are not even processed internally. The flaking intention is
constituted, at least partially, by the stone itself. (p. 173)
This reflects the ‘skilful coping’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962)
of the tool user. While the knowledge required to use
tools in this manner might be dismissed as ‘procedural’
or ‘tacit’ (because it does not fit squarely with the ‘cog-
nitivist’ account), it is integral to MET.
From a dynamic systems perspective, intentionality
can be considered from two perspectives. The first con-
cerns Bril’s insistence that the tool user needs to
appreciate the functional constraints of the task. This
means that the tool user will be seeking to make sense
of the Control parameters which can achieve the sys-
tem’s Order parameters. Only some of these Control
parameters can be affected by the tool user, either
through their selection of material or through their
movement. In this way, the ‘bringing forth’ of purpose
is a matter of satisfying the Order parameters of the
task.
The second aspect of intentionality comes from
operationalising human, task and environment con-
straints (Newell, 1986). This allows definition and anal-
ysis of factors which contribute to efficient tool use. Of
these factors, some are inherent properties of the object
being used as the tool and the material being worked
(and the tool user needs to recognise these and select
objects appropriately); some are properties of the man-
ner in which the tool is used (and the tool user needs to
appreciate the relationship between use and outcome);
and some are the outcome of the physics governing the
impact of tool on material (over which the tool user
has less control). Appreciating the relations between
these factors means that we should consider the situa-
tion in which the tool is used, for example, extracting
marrow, opening a nut, over and above the process of
manufacturing the tool.
Wynn and Coolidge (2016) note that ‘much of homi-
nin cognitive evolution was co-evolutionary with mate-
rial culture. Artefacts played a critical scaffolding role
from at least the beginning of stone knapping’ (p. 211).
Consequently, the behaviour of the actor is driven by
the ergonomics of the task. Purposeful tool use entails
the actor making changes in the coupling between self
and the environment through a tool. Ultimately, suc-
cessful achievement of the outcome requires that the
actor appreciates and satisfies the task constraints
(Biryukova & Bril, 2008; Bril et al., 2000, 2005, 2009,
2010, 2012; Nonaka et al., 2010; Rein et al., 2013;
Roux et al., 1995).
In this article, our modest proposal is that selecting
and using tools for bone cracking (and marrow extrac-
tion) are qualitatively and quantitatively different from
other uses of stone tools and that producing appropri-
ate tools requires appreciation of these demands. We
note that task constraints extend beyond the produc-
tion of the tool and encompass the purpose to which
the tool will be put. These constraints would come
under the heading of ‘displaced affordances’ (Wynn,
this issue) in that the purpose (as a future function of
the tool) contributes to an understanding of its form
and use. So, as noted above, an appropriate tool for
cutting and slicing need not be appropriate for bone
cracking (and vice versa). While this observation might
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feel mundane, we propose that it has implications for
understanding the ergonomics of stone tools as func-
tional artefacts and reiterates de Beaune’s (2000) advice
to understand the activities that can be performed with
stones, even those which might appear ‘trop humbles’.
From our brief presentation of bone cracking using
three different stone tools, we propose that separating
the ‘biomechanical’ (in terms of impact force), from the
‘sequence construction’ (in terms of defining constraints
and planning the required movements), from ‘cognitive
control’ (in terms of choice over stone, control move-
ments, etc.), makes little sense. Rather, approaches
which focus on the purpose of tool use provide the
‘general theoretical framework with which to approach
lithic technology’ for which Mahaney (2014) calls.
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